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This thesis is composed of two essays. The first essay is an application 
of dynamic factor analysis to real yields on Eurobonds denominated in the 
European Currency Unit (ECU). Treating the attractiveness of the ECU 
' -
' ' 
Eurobonds as an unobs'ervable variabl~. the purpose of this application is to 
derive an attreactiveness index for these Eurobonds and to test the impact of 
certain variables on their yields and attractiveness. The second essay 
investigates the inte~depefldence between long-term ECU Eurocurrency 
interest rates and short-term ECU and· Eurodollar interest rates following the 
Plaza Agreement of September 1985. In Particular, if the Plaza Agreement. 
resulted in a significant shift in exchange rate policy regime for the United 
States and the member states of the European Monetary System, the nature of 
the link should differ between the pre- and post-agreement periods. 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapters I, II and Ill comprise the first 
essay. Chapter I is a description of the European Monetary System. Chapter II 
is a literature r,eview concerning the official and private roles of the ECU as well 
as the operation of the EC~ banking market. Chapter Ill addresses the 
determinants of yields in the ECU Eurobond market. The chapter also includes 
a presentation of the econometric model used and the empincal results 
obtained. Chapter IV represents the second essay of the thesis. It is an 
investigation of the impact of the Plaza Agreement on the term structure of 
Eurocurrency interest rates in the United States and the European Monetary 
1 
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System. Chapter V is a summary of the two essays. The appendix contains a 
detailed presentation of the EM algorithm which is discussed in chapter Ill. 
The European Monetary System 
The European Monetary System (EMS) was formally established on 
March 13, 1979. Its members included the nine countries which then formed 
the European,Community (EC): Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Belongia, 
1988). Greeqe became_ an EMS partner in ~ 985 after joining the EC. Spain 
and Portugal jpined the EC in 198~. Spain joined the EMS in September 1990 
and Portugal may be admitted in the near future. 
Membership in the EMS, is a two-stage prc:>cess. The first stage requires 
each member nation to deposit twe11ty' percent of its gold and gross dollar 
assets with the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) in exchange for 
' 
an equivalent amount of European Currency Units (ECU's). The second stage 
of EMS membership requ,ires the EMS countries to participate in a system of 
fixed but adjustable exchange rates, known as the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) by pegging t~eir currencies to ~ach other and to the ECU (Masera, 1987). 
The purpose Qf this step is to stabiliza nominal bilateral exchange rates at 
predetermined levels for each bilat~ral set of rates. The United Kingdom and 
Greece are not participants in the ERM and, thus, the exchange rates of the U.K. 
an~ Greece are not tied to those of other EMS nations (Lomax, 1987). 
Each member of the ERM has to determine a central exchange rate for its 
currency, which is determined in currency units per ECU's. Although these 
central rates are supposed to establish equilibrium exchange values for the 
currencies, members of the ERM can seek adjustments. This has been done 
eleven times since the establishment of the EMS. Once the central exchange 
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rates are determined, a grid of bilateral cross exchange rates can be 
established among the currencies. Members of the ERM are expected to 
prevent their currencies from exceeding a 2.25 percent margin of either side of 
these central cross exchange rates, except Spain which has margins of six 
percent. 
If an ERM currency diverges too far from the central cross rates, the 
country whose currency is appreciating and/or the country whose currency is 
depreciating must intervene in order to reduce the pressure on the exchange 
rates (Karamouzis, 1987). The most common form of intervention is known as 
intramarginal intervention. If, for example, the Deutschemark (OM) is the 
appreciating currency, it is presumed'that the Bundesbank will lend a weaker 
partner the OMs it needs before the currency reaches the lower margin of its 
central cross exchange rate against the OM (Jones, 1988). 
Rogoff (1985) has suggested that increased monetary policy 
coordination may not have been responsible for the more predictable nominal 
and real exchange rates between France, Germany, and Italy which coincided 
with the adveRt of the EMS. The irference of the author is supported by the fact 
that the conditional variance of 'real interest differentials between these 
countries does not appear to have fallen. Rather, the high onshore-offshore 
interest differentials for French Franc and ltalian,Lira assets, and the ~ery slow 
' ' ' 
convergence of intra-EMS inflation rates suggest that capital controls have 
played a large role in enhancing the stability, and thus the predictability of 
exchange rates among France, Italy, and Germany. Without capital controls, the 
weak currencies in the EMS might have undergone ,continuous depreciation as 
they come under such speculative 'attacks' by investors that would have 
rendered intervention by EMS central banks in the foreign exchange markets 
useless. Thus, without capital controls, the very existence of the EMS is 
undermined. 
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Deravi and Metghalchi (1988) compared the volatility of bilateral nominal 
exchange rates of ERM currencies against the OM. They conclude that bilateral 
exchange rate variability has been reduced since March 1979. Moreover, it is 
found that the divergence of interest rates, in the long run and the short, and the 
rates of growth of the domestic component of the monetary base-both real and 
nominal ~have decreased. Based on th~ above three inferences, the authors 
conclude that the EMS has been a success. 
Ung-erer et. a/. (1986) point out that the improvement in the convergence 
of interest rates and monetary policies among EMS countries has not been 
matched by corresponding progress in' the fiscal sector. The authors 
emphasize widening fiscal deficits which, if not narrowed, may jeoparadize the 




The Official ECU 
When the EMS was launched, the ECU was assigned four different 
functions: a) as the denominator (numeraire) for the ERM, b) the basis for the 
divergence indicator/c) the denominator for the operations in the intervention 
arid credit mechanisms, d) as a reserve instrument and a means of settlement 
between monetary authorities in the EC. · Intervention in the EMS takes place 
whenever a certain currency is close to exceeding its permitted margin of 
fluctuations against another currency. Under the intervention mechanism, the 
central banks are required 'to make to one another short-term credit facilities to 
finance the needed interventions regardless of the amounts required. These 
operations are conducted through the European Monetary Cooperation Fund 
(EMCF) and are expressed in ECUs (European Documentation, 1987). 
Although not designed to: supplement their international reserves, the 
creation of ECUs facilitates the increased use of the reserves of the EMS 
countries by temporarily transforming a portion of their gold holdings that can be 
used, when necessary, without sale of the gold. Official ECUs are created by 
means of revolving three-month ~swaps of gold and U.S dollars between EMS 
members and the EMCF (IMF, 1987). EMS participants are required to deposit 
twenty percent of their gold reserves and twenty percent of their U.S dollar 
~ ' 
reserves with the EMCF for an equivalent amount of ECUs that is credited to 
them (European Documentation, 1987). Every three months the swaps are 
5 
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reversed and new amounts are swapped to ensure that they continue to 
represent at least twenty percent of the gold and U.S dollar reserves of 
participating central banks, and to bring the amount of ECUs in line with 
changed valuations of gold and U.S dollars (IMF, 1987). EMS central banks 
continue to administer the investment of the U.S dollars swapped and to receive 
interest at U.S dollar rates. The present revolving swap arrangement has led to 
volatility in the amount of ECUs created. Hence, the possibility of replacing the 
present swap arrangement with a permanent.transfet of reserves to the EMCF is 
under consideration by the Committee of Central Bank Gov~rnors in the EMS 
' . 
(IMF, 1987). 
Net users·of ECUs pay ECU interest rates on a monthly basis in ECUs. 
The calculation of the interest rate paid on net ECU credi~ balances was based 
' ' ' 
on the weighted average of the official discount rates of the member states. 
However, since July 1, 1985, the interest rate on the ECU has reflected market 
rates more closely because its calculation is being carriec;t out on the basis of 
the weighted average of specified short term instruments in the money markets 
of the EMS countries, weighted according to the relative importance of their. 
respective currencies in the ECU 9asket. The attractiveness of the ECU as a 
reserve currency is supposed to increase as the ECU interest rate has come to 
resemble more closely a market related interest rate. Moreover, as of July1, 
1985, EC central banks agreed to relax the rule whereby the amount a debtor 
central bank could settle in ECUs was limited to fifty percent of the claim being 
settled. This limit no longer appli-es if the central bank accepting ECUs is 1tself a 
net debtor in ECUs (IMF, 1987). 
The official ECU does not adjust continuously to market conditions 
_ because it cannot be traded. The interest rate for the official ECU is, however, 
adjusted monthly so that it can be kept close to market rates of component 
currencies. This is an incomplete substitute for pricing the offic1al ECU 1n 
foreign exchange markets as a technique for allowing the yield on the official 
ECU to remain competitive. 
The Market For Private ECU's 
7 
The ECU is a composite currency that is the sum of a fixed amount of 
each of the currencies of the member countries of the European Monetary 
System. The quantity of the currency of each country in the ECU reflects that 
country's relative strength in the E. C. in terms of the rate of growth of its GNP 
and the demand for its currency in international financial markets in companson 
to the other member countries of the EMS. The composition and the 
proportional weights of the ECU are subject to redefinition every five years and 
were redefined in September of 1984 and 1989. 
In addition to being the official accounting unit of the EMS, the ECU has 
found a private role in international finance. The currency composition of the 
private and official forms of the ECU is identical when both are viewed as units 
of account (Walton, 1988). Table I provides the weights of different currencies 
comprising the ECU. However, the private and official ECUs are different in the 
way they are created and used. Official ECU's are created by swap 
arrangements with the EMCF and are held only by the central banks of the 
member countries of the EMS and a small number of international monetary 
institutions such as the Bank for International Settlements (Masera, 1987). The 
usage of the official ECU is limited to monetary intervention purposes in the 
ERM. Private ECU's, however, can be created by bundling up the correct 
amounts of the component currencies (Walton, 1988). Any reference to the 
ECU in this essay employs the private form only. 
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TABLE I 
COMPOSITION OF THE ECU (SEPTEMBER 1988). 
Currency Amount: Currency 
0.71900 German Mark 
0.00878 Pound Sterling 
1.31000 French Francs 
140.00000 Italian Lire 
0.25600 Dutch Guilder 
3.71000 Belgian Francs 
0.14000 Luxembourg Francs 
0.21900 Danish Krone 
0.00871 Irish Pound 
1.15000 Greek Drachmas 
(Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin: November 1988) 
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The ECU has proved to be an attractive currency for transactions 
purposes in commercial markets. By the end of 1985, it had become the fifth 
most important Eurocurrency. Corporations in France and Italy are currently the 
strongest users of the ECU (Lomax, 1987). The growth of the private ECU 
market is attributed to a number of factors. First, the currency exposure of any 
I·, ' 
member of the EMS is less than the maximum risk wh~n any other individual 
EMS currency is being used. This is so because. the composition of the ECU, 
as a weighted sum of the individual European currencies, implies that its 
exchange rate will be less volatile than any individual currency (Lomax, 1987). 
Second, the interest yield for ECU denominated investments is likely to be less 
volatile than that of the most volatile 'national currency, since the ECU interest 
yield is related to the average in European markets (Lomax, 1987). The stability 
of the ECU is further enhanced by the commitment of EMS countries to stabilize 
' ' 
their bilateral exchange rates. Third, acquiring ECUs entails lower transaction 
costs to commercial entities than if. they were to design their own baskets of 
currencies.- Fourth; the ECU is appealing because, as a currency basket, the 
U.S. dollar is excluded. Hence, the EC-U can be used as an effective hedge 
against the U.S. dollar (Glick, .1987). Finally; since the ECU is by definition a 
Eurocurrency, it is free from the restrictive controls of national authorities 
(Lomax, 1987). 
Pozo (1987) examined the reasons for the surprisingly greater 
acceptance of the ECU over the Special Drawing Right (SDR), especially since 
the SDR is an older and simpler instrument. The author examined the 
predictability of the ECU and other monetary a_ss~ts by comparing the variability 
of the ECU with the variability of exchange rate movements of other currencies. 
Pozo assumed that the more predictable (less variable) a currency is, the more 
useful it is as a unit of account and a means of deferred payment. Also, the 
10 
average changes in the value of the ECU and other monetary units were 
examined to check their relative performance as a store of value. The 
Symmetric Stable Paretian (SSP) distribution was used to describe exchange 
rate changes. Pozo concluded that the ECU was less variable than other 
international currencies. Moreover, the stability of the ECU was attributed to a 
diversification effect, a coordination effect, and a capital controls effect. The 
diversification effect arises from the fact that the ECU is a currency basket of 
strong and weak currencies. Increases in appreciating currencies cancel 
decreases in depreciating currencies and thus the overall variability of the ECU 
is decreased. The coordination effect has to do with the coordination of 
economic policies among different countries to attain exchange rate stability. 
Finally, the capital controls effect refers to the ability of central banks to attain a 
certain exchange rate by imposing the necessary capital controls. 
Jorion (1987) investigated the mean-variance efficiency of the ECU 
basket to sh,ow that investing in the ECU is almost as efficient as tailoring an 
optimal portfolio consisting .of EC currencies. Further, the ECU is superior for 
diversification purposes if transaction costs are present. 
In addition to the stability of the ECU, Aggarwal and Soenen (1988) · 
attribute the dramatic growth of the private use of the ECU to its acceptability by 
EC institutions. These a11d certain European governments have actively 
supported the use of the ECU by private markets. As the official unit of the EC, 
Europeans have a national interest in the ECU that does not exist for the SDR. 
Edison (1987) concluded that the success of the ECU cannot be 
attributed to any one particular factor. The increasing importance of the ECU 
can be traced to political and institutional factors in addition to the definition of 
the ECU as a stable basket which is a weighted average of all the EMS 
currencies. Edison conducted two experiments: The first experiment focused on 
1 1 
the impact of alternative weighting schemes on the currency composition of the 
ECU and on the dollar value of the ECU. The second experiment analysed 
West German exchange rate policy assuming its real exchange rate 1s pegged 
to a basket other than the ECU. The object of the exercise was to compare the 
derived optimal basket path with that of the ECU basket path. The first 
experiment indicated that when there was little exchange rate variability 
between the currencies that comprise the ECU , the value of the ECU remains 
invariant to any changes in the shares assigned to the currenc1es comprising 
the ECU basket. The second experiment demonstrated that if West Germany 
decides to peg its currency to a currency basket, the ECU basket would closely 
approximate the theoretical optimal basket that the DM would be pegged to 
outside the EMS. Edison concludes that the ECU should surv1ve periods of 
large dollar depreciation as it has survived large dollar appreciations in the 
early eighties. What appears to matter for the survival of the ECU is that there 
be little exchange rate variability between the currencies that comprise the 
EMS. 
Undesirable Features of the ECU 
Currently, no single central bank manages the circulation of the ECU. 
According to Levich (1987), this feature does not appear to be a fatal drawback. 
Another negative aspect of the ECU has, however, received attention 
(Levich, 1987a). 
The ECU is an open rather than a closed basket of currencies. In an 
open basket, the currencies in the basket and the factors by which they are 
weighted may change. Agents who wish to use the ECU for hedging specific 
positions in one or more of the ten component currencies of the ECU will view 
1 2 
the open basket concept as an element of risk (Lev1ch, 1987b). Indeed, the 
possibility of a depreciation of the ECU relative to the currencies that comprise 
the basket after the next recomposition has recently prompted multinationals to 
issue bonds denominated in ECU. They based their decision on the assumption 
that they will get funds in a currency that will be weaker when the time comes to 
pay back what they owe. Those who believe that the ECU will depreciate base 
their claim on the fact that the 'soft' currencies will dominate the 'hard' 
currencies in the basket after the Spanish Peseta and the Portugese Escudo 
are assigned weights in the ECU (Koenig, 1989). 
The Operation of the ECU Banking Market 
Private ECUs are usually created by 'changing the denomination of 
assets already in existence. A bank can create a private ECU deposit by 
accepting currency and recording the value of the deposit in ECUs. The bank 
will cover its newly created ECU liability by exchanging the currency deposited 
in a way that establishes an asset of the same value in terms of the ECU. If no 
true ECU asset is available, the bank will exchange the currency deposited for 
the ten European currencies in the same proportions as in the ECU basket (a 
process referred to as 'unbundling'). These assets are usually deposited 1n the 
ECU interbank market (Aggarwal and Soenen, 1988). 
In the absence of an ECU central bank, a system of "Mutual ECU 
Settlement Accounts" (MESA) has been developed. This clearing system is 
centered around the following seven European clearing banks with whom the 
banks trading in ECUs are likely to have an account: Kredietbank, Brussels; 
Lloyds Bank, London; Kredietbank, Luxembourg; Credit Lyonais, Paris; Banque 
Bruxelles Lambert, Brussels; lnstituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino, Turin; and 
Societe Generale de Banque, Brussels (Saunders and Sienkiewicz, 1988). 
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This system greatly simlifies the settlement of ECU transfers between banks and 
meant that, for most transactions, it is no longer necessary to break the ECU 
down into its component parts. 
The ECU banking market has been predominantly interbank ever since it 
came into being. This remains the case, with interbank lending accounting for 
77% of international ECU asset$ as of the end of March 1988. The market is 
also characten~ed by a disparity between ECU assets and liabilities, with net 
assets e~panding from ECU 6 billion at end-1985 to ECU 14 billion at end-
March 1988. This was primarily due to the increased demand by non-banks for 
ECU loans (Walton, 1988) 
CHAPTER Ill 
THE DETERMINANTS OF YIELDS IN 
THE ECU EUROBOND MARKET 
The ECU Bond Mai-ket 
The first issue of ECU Eurobonds took place in 1981. From 1981 to 
1985, the use of th_e ·ECU in international capital markets grew at a rapid pace. 
By 1985, the ECU was the fifth most important currency for international bond 
issues, accounting for 4.5 percent of total international fixed and floating rate 
bond issues. Since 1985, issues of ECU international bonds have slowed 
down. Nonetheless, ECU Eurobond~issues accounted for 5.3 percent of total 
Eurobond issues forth~ first nine months of 1988 (The Economist, Dec.1 0, 
1988). For borrowers, ECU Eurobond issues are attractive for several reasons. 
Since they are Euro-issues, they are free from national restrictions. Also, they 
provide diversification of liabilities due to the composite nature of the ECU. 
ECU Eurobond yields, however, are less than those of_ a weighted basket of 
Eurocurrency bonds of comparable maturities and credit rating. Investors are 
- ' 
· willing to accept yields that are less than the weighted average of yields 
available in individual EMS markets for the benefit of not havmg to deal with 
- different currencies and markets in order to obtain a basket of Eurocurrency 
bonds similar to the ECU Eurobond in composition. Exchange rate and interest 
rate stability have also .been cited as major factors contributing to the demand 
for ECU Eurobonds by investors (Walton, 1988). Investors are able to share in 
the gains of the West German, French, and U.K. bond markets while reducing 
14 
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the risks of foreign exchange losses (Pitman, 1988). Furthermore, ECU bonds 
are attractive instruments for investing in "soft" currencies with high yields for 
which there is no liquid international market, such as the Greek Drachma. Also, 
the presence of capital controls in France and Italy, which are scheduled to be 
removed early 1990, makes investment in ECU Eurobonds a convenient 
method for participating in the Italian Lira and French Franc Eurobond markets 
that are characterized by high returns (The Economist, Dec.1 0, 1988). 
ECU Euroboqds suffer some drawbacks. As interest rates in Europe 
converge and currency risks become smaller, some mvestors may prefer those 
Eurobonds that offer a slightly lower yield than those on ECU bonds, but which 
are more liquid and are denominated in a single currency with a home market 
such as British Pound and Deutsche-mark denominated Eurobonds. Moreover, 
there may be investors who prefer Eurobonds that offer yields higher than those 
available for ECU bonds but do not have the interest rate and currency stability 
that ECU Eurobonds provide. Thus, bonds that outperform the ECU Eurobond 
(i.e. have a higher yield than the ECU Eurobond) may be viewed as an 
attractive investment. 
The Application of Dynamic Factor 
Analysis to ECU-denominated Eurobonds 
The aim of this chapter is to construct a time series attractiveness 
index for ECU Eurobonds using the estimation and maximization (EM) 
algorithm of Watson and Engle (1983). The EM algorithm has been applied by 
Melvin and Schlagenhauf (1985, 1986) to derive country risk indices for France 
and Mexico. Through the EM algorithm, the impact of the attractiveness index 
and a measure of capital controls on the yields of ECU Eurobonds will be 
1 6 
examined. Finally, several variables influencing the attractiveness of ECU 
Eurobonds will be investigated. These include the yield on the US Eurodollar 
and Eurodeutschemark bonds, and the ECU/dollar exchange rate. 
In financial markets, the higher the risk associated with a certain bond 
issue, the greater the yield on bonds (Finnerty and Nunn, 1985). Conversely, 
the lower the risk associated with the bond issue, that is, the more attractive the 
bond issue is. tp investors, the smaller the yield. The inverse relationship 
between the attractiveness.of ECU Eurobonds and their yield is captured by 
specifying the following equation of yield determination: 
<1> 
Yt is the real rate of return on ECU Eurobonds at timet, Xt is the value of the 
ECU Eurobond attractiveness index at t, CCt is a variable measuring capital 
controls. Capital controls· are measured by the difference between the on and 
offshore interest rates in Italy. While the EMS members dismantled capital 
controls throughout the 1980's, Italy (and to a lesser extent France) continued 
to maintain these. In light of Project 1992, however, the remaining capital 
controls will be dismantled by the end of 1990. Finally, B1-B4 are parameters 
to be estimated. O~r a priori hypothesis is that B2 should be negative. If the 
attractiveness of the ECU Eurobonds increases, the real rate of return 
associated with it is expected to shrink. B1 is an intercept that is included to 
capture the effects on ECU Eurobonds of the basket recompositions that the 
ECU periodically undergoes as the strong currencies have to depreciate in 
order to make room for newly introduced currencies. The coefficient of capital 
controls is expected to be positive. As the level of capital controls decreases, it 
is expected to attract capital inflows into Italy. Such inflows have already been 
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reported in the financial press (The Economist, Nov. 4, 1989). As the supply of 
funds increases, the yields on instruments denominated in Italian Lira will 
diminish. Consequently, the yield on ECU instruments is expected to decrease 
since the return on instruments denominated in the Italian currency enter into 
the composition of ECU instruments of cor:nparable maturities. Hence, a 
decrease in the level of capital controls in Italy is expected to cause a decrease 
in the yield on ECU Eurobonds. The ·less exchange controls there are the 
narrower is the 'difference in yields between onshore and offshore financial 
instruments denomin-ated in the Italian Lira (Jones, 1988). And thus, the 
differential between the loc::al interest rate and the Eurolira interest rate which is 
the proxy for the level of exchange controls in Italy. 
Since the ECU bond attractiveness index is unobservable, following 
Melvin and Schlagenhauf (1985, 1986), we assume that it evolves over time as 
follows: 
Xt=0Xt-1 + ooZt +Vt. 
Zt is a matrix of variables which are hypothesized to determine the 
attractiveness of ECU Eurobonds. The matrix includes the following variables: 
the yield on Eurodollar (DOLt) and Eurodeutschemark bonds (DMBt). and the 
ECU/US dollar exchange rate (EXt). oo and 0 are parameters to be estimated. 
The model of equations <1 >- <2> re.lies on time domain-dynamic factor 
analysis. According to this methodology, a statistical model is formulated as if 
the data were available on· the attractiveness index, which is an unobservable 
variable. Then, a joint distribution of the observable variables can be derived. 
This serves as the likelihood function (l) for estimating the unknown 
parameters. In addition, this framework generates estimates of the values of the 
desired unobserved variables in an index form. Details are provided in the 
Appendix. 
The purpose of equation <2> is to identify the variables that determine 
the attractiveness of.ECU Eurobonds over time. The lagged Xt term (Xt-1) 
1 8 
indicates the possible presence of a significant autoregressive process. It is 
reasonable to assume that the attractiveness of a financial instrument, such as 
the ECU Eurobond, is positively autocorrelated as perceptions of the 
attractiveness associated with a financial in,strument change slowly (Melvin & 
Schlagenhauf, 1986). Hence the lagged Xt term is expected to be positive and 
significant. 
According to Evans (1987), a 'real world' Eurobond trader, the ECU/US 
dollar exchange rate is not a significant determinant of attractiveness, since 
ECU bond traders pay little attention to it. In addition, the yield on US 
Eurodollar bonds of comparable maturities to those denominated in ECUs are 
not expected to influence ECU bond attractiveness since the two markets are 
unrelated (Evans, 1987). The yield on Euro-DM bonds, however, is expected to 
be negatively related to the ECU Eurobond attractiveness variable since ECU 
Eurobonds are traditionally viewed as an alternative to holding Euro-DM bonds. 
Therefore, when the yield on the Euro-DM bonds increases, the attrac~iveness 
of ECU Eurobonds is expected to diminish (The Economist, April 28, 1990). 
1 9 
Model Estimation and Empirical results 
The model of equations <1 > and <2> is applied to ECU Eurobonds of two 
different maturities at the 'long end' of the market. Yield data on a monthly basis 
for the period November 1984-0ctober 1989 is available from Eurostat a 
publication of the. Statistical Office of the European Communities. One 
Eurobond is of maturity of five to seven years while the second is an ECU 
Eurobond with a maturity of more than seven years. The yields are calculated 
each Wednesday from a sample of fixed interest bonds denominated in ECU 
and listed on the Luxembourg Sto<;:k Exchange. In order to obtain real yields, 
yields have been deflated by the annual rate of change of a composite index of 
consumer prices, that includes all the member states of the EC. This index was 
also obtained from Eurostat. Eurodollar and Euro-DM bonds of comparable 
maturities are incorporated in the two estimated models. For ECU Eurobonds 
with a maturity of five to seven years', dollar Eurobonds issued by private 
corporations with a remaining maturity of four to seven years and Euro-DM 
bonds issued by private corporations with a remaining maturity of three to seven 
years are included in the model. As for ECU Eurobonds with a matunty of 
greater than seven years, Eurodollar and Euro-DM bonds issued by private 
corporations with a remaining maturity of seven to fifteen years are incorporated 
in the model. The·yields on Eurodollar and Euro-DM bonds are expressed in 
real terms by deflating the yields by the annual rate of change of the consumer 
price indices for the US and West Germany, respectively. The yields on these 
bonds were obtained from OECD Financial Statistics Section1-Part 2 while the 
consumer price indices were obtained from Eurostat. The ECU/US dollar 
exchange rate was obtainedfrom ECU-EMS Information published by the 
Statistical office of the European Communities. The Italian offshore interest rate 
is the three-month Eurolira deposit rate while the onshore interest rate is the 
three-month money market interest rate in Italy. Both of these interest rates 
were obtained from The Economist 
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The results from the estimation of the model are shown in the first two 
columns of Table II.. In order to examine whether the two bonds of different 
maturities b~have similarly a test of the equality of coefficients across maturities 
was performed. I is equal to the value of the likelihood function obtained from 
the model restricting the two ECU Eurobonds to be equal (93.6424) divided by 
the product of the values of the likelihood functions obtained from estimating the 
two ECU Eurobond models separately (42.4194 and 45.3391). The likelihood 
ratio statistic -21og 1t for the test that the coefficients in the two estimated models 
for ECU Eurobonds are jointly equal is 6.04. Based on the chi-squared table 
the hypothesis of equality of coefficients cannot be rejected at the 0.01 level 
since he critical value c2 8,.99 is 15.51. This suggests that there is no 
significant difference between· the ECU Eurobonds under consideration. 
Conseq'uently, an additional model is estimated where data on the two ECU 
Eurobonds are pooled into one sample. As hypothesized, the attractiveness 
has a significant negative effect on yields on ECU Eurobonds in all three 
models. Thus, the real rate of return on ECU Eurobonds decreases when 
attrativeness increases. Italian capital controls exert a positive significant effect 
on the real returns of ECU Eurobonds .. For ECU Eurobonds witn a maturity of 
' 
five to seven years, CCt is significant. CCt-1 has the statistically significant 
coefficient in the other two models. Hence, as indicated earlier, the real yield on 




ESTIMATED ECU EUROBOND ATTRACTIVENESS MODEL 
Beal :tield Maturity Maturity Pooled 
Eguatjon 5-7 years >7 years sample 
X -0.216* -0.244* -0.255* 
(-5.985) (-5.832) (-8.255) 
Constant 1.783 1.550 1.549 
(0.294) (0.222) (0.317) 
CCt c 0.080* 0.013 0.013 
(2:245) (0.355) (0.518) 
CCt-1 -:0.015 0.084 ** 0.083* 
(-0.424) (2.431) (3.448) 
Allrami~eoess 
E;guatico 
Xt-1 0.884* 0.885* 0.887* 
(16.875) (14.988) (21.478) 
EXt 0.020 '0.378 0.189 
(0.009) (0.157) (0.115) 
DOLt 0.378 0.285 0.273 
(1.298) (1.012) (1.373) 
DMBt -0.661 * -0.627* -0.574* 
(-3.418) (-3.158) (-4.287) 
(t statistics are 1n parentheses. Cntical values were obtained from the Student-t distnbutlon) 
• Significant at the 0.01 level. 
•• Significant at the 0 05 l~vel 
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Turning to the attractiveness equation, the lagged variable is positive and 
significant in all three cases, verifying the presence of a significant 
autoregressive process. According to Melvin and Schlagenhauf (1986), it is the 
presence of such a dynamic process in time series data that mandates the use 
of dynamic factor analysis instead of sta~dard factor analysis. 
Both the ECU/dollar exchange rate ~nd the real returns of Eurodollar 
bonds have no significant impact on the attractiveness of ECU Eurobonds. The 
coefficient of Euro-DM bonds, on the other hand, is negative and highly 
significant. These results ~ubstantiate the argument that changes in the 
- ' 
ECU/dollar exchange rate and developments in the Eurodollar bond market do 
not impinge on ECU Eurobond yields. 
A likelihood ratio St(itistic (-21og 1t1) was calculated for the test that the 
EXt and DOLt coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 11 is equal to the value of the 
likelihood function obtained from the model restricting EXt and DOLt to equal 
zero divided by the likelihood function obtained from the unrestricted model. 
For ECU Eurobonds with maturities between 5 and 7 years, -21og 1t1 is 0.19 
(38.5961/42.4194). As for ECU Eurobonds with a maturities that exceed 7 
years, -21og 7t1 is 0.18 (41.4261 /45.3391 ). Finally, -21og 1t1 for the pooled 
sample is 0.15 (86.8877/93.6424). The degrees of freedom for this test are 
equal to the number of regressors in the unrestricted model minus the number 
of regressors in the restricted model, that is, 2 degrees of freedom. The critical 
value :x;2 2,.99 is 9.21. Hence, EXt and DOLt are jorntly equal to zero in the 
three estimated models. 
A second likelihood ratio statistic (-21og 1t2) was calculated for the test 
that the CCt and CCt-1 coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 1t2 is equal to the 
value of the likelihood function obtained from the model restricting CCt and 
CCt-1 to equal zero divided by the value of the likelihood function obtained from 
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the unrestricted model. For ECU bonds with matunties between 5 and 7 years, 
-21og 7t2 is 0.16 (39.2544/42.4194). As for ECU bonds with maturities that 
exceed 7 years, -21og 7t2 is 0.14 (42.3515/45.3391 ). -21og 7t2 for the pooled 
sample is 0.12 (88.2276/93.6424). The number of degrees of freedom for this 
test is 2. The cri,tic~l value ::c2 2,.99 is 9.21. Thus, CCt and CCt-1 are jointly 
equal to zero in the three estimated models. 
The ECU Eurobond Attractiveness Index 
Figures1. and 2 depict the estimated attractiveness indices for the 
' ' 
two ECU Eurobonds under co~sideration, while figure 3 charts the 
attractiveness index for the sample of observations that comprise the two 
Eurobonds over the 1984,-1989 period. The three indices display an almost 
identical path over time. These indices ,are the estimated unobservable X 
factors in the models and can be considered to be the maximum likelihood 
estimates based o~ the ?ata and the estimated parameters of the models 
(Melvin & Schlagenhauf, 1.986). The index is relatively stable from November 
1984 till August 1986. Late 1986 is a period of decreased attractiveness 
followed by a briefly increasing index until May 1987. The ECU bond market 
went through a period of weakness in late 1986 because of the fall in the price 
of oil, ana the depreciation of the British pound against the other European 
currencies. The depreciation of the British pound by fifteen percent against the 
OM in the second half of' 1986 led to the depreciation of the ECU against the 
other European curre~ci~s. This meant that non-British Pound holders of ECU 
Eurobonds suffered an exchange los~ during that period. According to Lomax 
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was the reduced interest premium compared with OM Eurobonds, making them 
relatively less attractive. 
The Autumn of 1986 marked the discovery of the ECU Eurobond market 
by Japanese investors (Cohen, 1987). Having suffered exchange losses of 
their own, and with the yield on ECU Eurobonds becoming more _attractive, 
Japanese investors found an .ideal financi~l instrument in the ECU. This 
demand for EQU Eurobonds by Japanese investors accounts for the rise in the 
' ' ' 
attractiveness index from the end of 1986 till May 1987. However, over the 
summer of 1987, with international tension rising in the Persian Gulf, most 
investors, especially the Japan·ese, shifted their holdings to domestic financial 
markets and government bonds (Cohen, 1987). The ECU Eurobond 
attractiveness index declines from June 1987 till the end of that year. 
In the first nine months of 1988, increased demand for ECU Eurobonds 
brought yields down to eight percent from nearly ten percent in September of 
1987. That surge in ECU .activity marks the beginning of continuous growth in 
the volume of ECU Eurobonds issued for the rest of the period of this study. 
This is mirrored by a rise in the attractiveness index that is not followed by any 
reversals for that same period. The appeal of ECU Eurobonds since the 
' ' 
beginning of 1988 can be attributed to three factors. 
First, the market has acquired increased depth. A greater number of 
quality issuers has entered the market. Before .1988, the market was dominated 
by issues from EEC official borrowers such as the Europeafl Investment Bank 
and the European Coal and Steel Community. In 1988, ECU Eurobond issues 
by the French government, Italy's state railway, GMAC, Toyota, and IBM 
contributed to the diversity of quality borrowers in the ECU market. 
Second, the swap markets played a part in promoting activity in the ECU 
bond market. The benefit for those engaged in swapping ECU assets comes 
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from arbitrage opportunities created by Italy's domestic ECU bonds. Swaps are 
mostly executed from fixed rate ECU assets into floating rate dollar assets. 
Swaps take place as follows: Banks based in countries with dual tax 
agreements with Italy can pick a 12.5 percent tax benefit when the Italian 
treasury auctions five-year ECU denominated certificates (CTE's). Commercial 
banks, then, buy these tax bearing government bonds at a discount. Instead of 
holding the bonds to maturity, banks "swap out" of ECU into dollar assets, 
picking up several basis points over Libor in the process, whrch includes the 
12.5 percent tax refund paid in accordance with the dual tax agreement (Keller, 
1990). 
Third, ECU yields have risen. Japanese investors have been lured back 
into the market by high yields on ECU bonds, which, by the last quarter of1989, 
compared favourably with its traditional alternative, the Deutschemark 
Eurobond (The Economist, April 28, 1990). 
Summary 
A dynamic factor analysis model has been utilized to estimate 
attractiveness indices for ECU Eurobonds of two distinct maturities in a smooth 
index form. The model utilizes the real yield on ECU Eurobonds as the 
measured variable containing information on the attractiveness of ECU 
Eurobonds. It is demonstrated that ECU Eurobond attractiveness is negatively 
ralated to the real returns on Euro-DM bonds. This result confirms emprncally 
the often cited, but as yet untested, observation in the financral press that Euro-
DM bonds are traditional alternatives to ECU Eurobonds. 
CHAPTER IV 
DID THE PLAZA AGREEMENT MATIER? EVIDENCE FROM US-EMS 
EUROCURRENCY INTEREST RATES 
Introduction 
In September 1_985, 'the Finance Ministers and central bank governors of 
France, West Germany, Japan, the U.K and the USA (the Group of Five) rriet in 
New York and struck an accord that became known as the Plaza Agreement. 
The Group of Five (GS) expressed their .~o~mitment to undertake coordinated 
intervention in the foreign exchange markets. According to the Plaza 
communique [cited in Frase·r (1987)] " .. -. in view of the present and. prospective 
changes in fundamentals, some further orderly appreciation of the main non-
dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable. They [GS] stand ready to 
cooperate more closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful." 
While general discussions of the Plaza Agreement abound [e.g., 
Funumachi (1988) and Feldstein {1-989)], little empirical work on the impact of 
the Plaza Agreement has appeared in the literature. Klein, Mizrach, and 
Murphy (1989) found that the Plaza Agreement marked the beginning of a 
fundamental shift in the exchange rate policy regime for the United States, West 
Germany, and Japan. Using a simple two-country model of the open economy, 
.the authors found a strong relationship between exchange rates and news 
about the trade balance during the period after the Plaza Agreement, but found 
no relationship at all during the period preceding the Agreement. 
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This chapter fills a gap in the empirical literature. It considers whether 
the agreement represented a fundamental shift in exchange-rate policy regime 
for the US and the countries of the European Monetary System (EMS)., In 
particular, it tests whether, by altering investors' perceptions, the agreement 
resulted in signi~icantly transforming the link between short-term Eurodollar 
interest rates and long-term EMS Eurorates. In what follows, long-term EMS 
', ' 
Eurorates will be'proxiedby the interest rate on long-term Eurobonds 
denominated in the European Currency Unit (ECU). At this juncture, a short 
note on the ECU .and ECU-denominated Eurobonds is in order. 
The European Currency Unit (ECU) came into existence in 1979 in 
connection with the formation of the EMS. Its purpose was to give the member 
countries of the EMS a monetary unit which could be used as a vehicle to 
c \ •. 
promote monetary integration. The ECU is a composite currency which 
contains specified amounts of the currencies of the member states of the 
European Community (EC). The weight of each currency in the basket is based 
on each country's share in EC gross national product and trade and is reviewed 
every five years. 
The ECU has proved to be. an attractive instruments in private financial 
markets. In terms of the volume of transactions denominated in a particular 
currency, it ranked fifth in 1985, according to Masera (1987). The ECU 
represents a 'bundling' of positions in the component currencies. Thus, an ECU 
Eurobond is equivalent to a basket of Eurobonds denominated in the 
component currencies. Therefore, it offers· investors substantial savings in 
transaction costs (Levich, 1987). More 'importantly, the success of the ECU has 
been attributed to its stability in terms of its component currencies. 
The next section of the chapter presents the framework which links short-
term interest rates in the domestic region (US) and long-term rates in the foreign 
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(EMS). In what follows, the long-term interest rate in the EMS will be proxied by 
the interest rate on long-term ECU-denominated Eurobonds. The long-term 
ECU Eurobond rate is, in turn, the return on bonds denominated in a currency 
basket which includes all the currencies of the EMS. ECU Eurobond rates are 
available in the Eurostat publication ECU-EMS Information. These rates are the 
unweighted arithmetic averages of weekly yields of these bonds. The weekly 
yields are calculated each Wednesday from a sample of fixed interest bonds, 
denominated in ECU and listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. Short-
term interest rates ,are those on three month Eurocurrency'deposit rates. Those 
for ECU deposit rates were obtained from ECU-EMS Information and those for 
Eurodollar deposit rates from the OECD Financial Statistics: Section 1-Part2. 
The link is examined within the framework of the term structure of Eurocurrency 
interest rates. The reason for focusing on interest rates in the EMS rather than 
individual-country interest rates is that the Plaza Agreement provided, inter alia, 
for joint coordination between the major participants in the EMS and the US. In 
contrast to individual-country interest rates, use of EMS interest rates, which 
contain information across various participants in the Agreement, exploits the 
joint nature of the Agreement. The model highlights the role played by 
exchange rate expectations in linking interest rates between the two regions. In 
particular, if the Agreement provided for a significant shift in exchange-rate 
policy regime, the nature of the link should be significantly altered. The 
following section of the chapter presents the empirical results from the testing 
this hypothesis. The final section offers some concluding remarks. 
The Interdependence Between ECU and Eurodollar Interest Rates 
Bisignano (1983) studied the impact of exchange rate intervention 
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using domestic interest rates in the US, West Germany and Canada. The 
author concluded that, following the October 1979 change of monetary policy 
control procedures by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Republic of Germany 
found that its financial markets were more linked to US financial markets than 
before. This ,linkage emerged because of strong 'expectations that the Bundes 
Bank would not allow long-run currency depreciation of the OM against the US 
dollar. Consequently, expected future' short-term interest rates in Germany 
were strongly influenced by changes in short-term interest rates in the US. 
Such a linkage depends on the expectations theory of the term structure and 
the assumption of international interest rate parity. The same linkage was 
evident in the case of Canada and the US in spite of the fact that a long term 
depreciation of the Canadian dollar was expected after October 1979. 
Bisignano's results suggest that, despite' a 'weak' currency, the exchange rate 
objectives of the Bank of Canada were as strong as those of Germany. 
Following Bisignano, Krol (1 ~86) examined the interdependenc~ of the 
term structure of Eurocurrency interest rates focusing on short-term Eurodollar 
interest rates and long-term Euromark and Swiss Eurofranc interest rates. The 
linkage between long term interest rates in one region's offshore financial 
' ' 
market and short term interest rates in the other offshore market was arrived at 
by combining a rational expectations model of the term structure of interest rates 
with the concept of international interest rate parity. 
Cumby and Mishkin (1986) demonstrated thet ex ante real interest rates 
in several European countries, Canada, and the, United States had been 
considerably higher since 1980 than during the 1970's. The authors also found 
a significant positiv~ correlation between real interest rate movements in the US 
~ 
and those in seven other industrialized countries. While significantly positive, 
the degree of international linkage in real rates was less than complete, leaving 
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open the posssibility that European monetary policy could influence domestic 
economic activity. The evidence presented by Cumby and Mishkin also points 
to significant independence in real rate movements in the countries under 
study. 
The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates states 
that agents arbitrage bonds of varying maturities. The. result of this is an 
"equilibrium" in which the return on a long term bond equals the average of the 
return on a certain short term bond and the expected returns on future short 
term bonds over the same holding period. That is, bonds of like characteristics 
but of different maturities, are gpod substitutes f.or each pther. Thus, their 
average expected return over a given time horizon are approximately equal 
(Bisignano, 1982). 
The term structure relationship between Eurocurrency rates can be 
represented by the following simple linear rational expectations model: 
Rt,.. 9 + 1/n Et ( rt+ rt+ 1 + ............ +rt+i) <3> 
At,.. 8 + n-1 ( rt + r Etrt+i) <4> 
At and rt+i (i>O) represent the long and short term Eurocurrency intrerest rates, 
respectively. Etrt+i is the expected value of the short term Eurocurrency interest 
rate in period t+i, formed rationally in period t using all current information. The 
information set contains all the information needed for forecasting rt+i· a is a 
term premium which reflects investors' risk aversion and is assumed to be 
constant over time (Krol, 1986). 
The international-interest rate parity is an arbitrage relationship that 
holds for two assets of identical maturity but different currency of denomination. 
For the two returns to be equivalent in equilibrium, the compounded yield 
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differential between the two securities should equal the expected change in the 
exchange rate (Bisignano, 1982). 
The international interest-rate parity condition can be represented as: 
1 +A = n-1 [(Etst+n- st) + 0] 
1+A* 
<5> 
A and A* are the market yields on domestic and foreign Eurobonds, 
respectively. St \epresents,the exch~nge rate defined in units of home currency 
per unit of foreign ~urrency. f equals the exchange rate premium which is 
assumed to be constant over time (Krol, 1-986). Taking logs and using the 
approximation ln(1 +R)=A 
<6> 
et represents the natural logarithm of the exchange rate and Etet+n equals the 
expected value of the exchange rate in period t+n rationally formed in period t 
using all current information. It is as~umed that the information set contains 
both domestic government policy rules and any exchange rate policy rules 
(Krol, 1986). The relationship between the foreign long term Eurocurrency 
interest rate At* and short term home Eurocurrency interest rates rt+i is 
established by solving <5> for At, substituting in <4> and solving for A*·t· 
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Here Aet+i equals the change in the exchange rate from period t+i-1 to t+i. It 
can be observed from <7> that the level of the foreign country's long term 
Eurocurrency interest rates is influenced by the average of current and 
expected levels of the home- country's short term Eurocurrency interest rates 
and the expected change in the exchange rate in each individual time period. 
Any change in policy rules would have an impact on the term structure equation 
of the foreign region. 
""' -R*t ""'9 + n-1 [ rt + ~Etrt+i.- IAet+i- o] 
£:1 l.:O 
where R*t is the market yield on foreign (ECU) Eurobonds and rt is the short-
term Eurocurrency interest rate in the home region (US). n' is a given time 
period over which bonds of different maturities are held. Etrt+i is the expected 
value of the short-term Eurocl.jrrency interest rate in period t+i, formed rationally 
in period t using all current information and A is the change operator. Both the 
term premium (g) and the exchange rate premium (o) are assumed constant 
over time, as in Krol (1986). 
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The equation demonstrates that the foreign (ECU) long-term 
Eurocurrency interest rate is influenced by the average of current and expected 
levels of the home (US) short-term Eurocurrency interest rates and the expected 
change in the exchange rate in each time period. 
The critical point in establishing the link between short-term US and long 
,~ 
-term ECU interest rates is the potential for joint action on the part of central 
banks and its effect on exchange' rate expectations. In this chapter we examine 
the impact of central bank intervention in the member states of the EMS, vis a 
vis the dollar, for the, period January 1984-February 1989. The period is chosen 
because yields on ·all ECU Eurobonds are available beginning in January 
1984. 
The period prior to the Plaza Agreement of September 1985 was 
characterized by a lack of coordination of exchange rate policy between the US 
and the member countries of the EMS., Between 1979 and 1985, the 
currencies of the majo'r participating countries in the EMS depreciated against 
the US dollar. During t~ose years, r~alignment of central rates, intervention in 
the currency markets, and other short term monetary measures were 
unsuccessfully implemented by the major members of the EMS in order to 
alleviate market pressure on their currencies (Fraser, 1987). Thus no clear cut 
policy influence on exchange rate expectations is evident during this period and 
therefore short-term Eurodollar interest rates are expected to influence 
significantly the long-term ECU rate. 
The Plaza agreement expressed official commitment to coordinated 
intervention in the currency markets. Jherefore, if the Plaza Agreement 
provided a significant change in exchange rate policy regime and clear 
direction to investors' expectations, then the exchange rate terms in <8> are 
expected to dominate, and therefore no significant impact of US short-term 
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Eurodollar rates should be detected. If investors perceive that short-term 
Eurocurrency interest rates are moving against a bac:kdrop of exchange rate 
coordination, interest rate developments within the EMS are expected to be 
dominant, while short-term interest rate developments in the US are expected to 
be inconsequential to tneir decision-making process. In order to capture the 
effect of the shift from uncoordinated to coordinated exchange rate policy on the 
term structu(e equatio'n a comparison of the period-prior to the Plaza Agreement 
with that following the Agreement is undertaken. It is expected that in the first 
period, a significant relationship will exist between short-term Eurodollar rates 
and long-term ECU interest r~tes. WJth the presence _of coordmated exchange 
rate policy in the second period, it is, expected that short-term Eurodollar mterest, 
' 
rates will not be significant while short-term ECU rates will influence the long- _ 
term rate significantly. 
Empirical Results 
The hypothesis advanced in the previous section can be tested by 
estimating the following ,equation:' 
<9> 
where r*t is the foreign short-term inter~st rate (ECU) and llt is a stochastic 
disturbance term. All other terms were previously defined. The equation is 
estimated with long-term interest rate data for three maturities: less than five 
years, 5-7 years and greater than -7. Short-term rates are three-month 
Eurodollar and ECU deposit rates sampled monthly. The estimating period is 
January 1984 to February 1989. 
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The estimating equation is expressed in difference form in the relevant 
variables because of 'the suggestion in the literature [see, for example, Nelson 
and Plosser (1982)] of the presence of a unit root in most macroeconomic 
variables. In order to confirm the presence of a unit root in both short-term ECU 
and US interest rates an~ the long-term ECU rates ~n augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test was conducted. The augmented Dickey-F.uller test [see Dickey and Fuller_ 
(1981)] involv~s estir:nating the following equation: 
~Yt = CC+ a1t + a2Yt-1 + a3~Yt-1 + Wt <10>' 
where Yt refers to short-term Eurodollar and ECU rates and long-term ECU rates 
and t represents a time trend. The relevant statistics Tt were -0.9886 and -
'' 
2.1273 for the· US and ECU short-term respectively and -1.27, -1.32 and -1.48 
for the three long-term bond rates. Based on the critical value from table 8.5.2 
of Fuller (1976), the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level 
-in all cases. The Box-Lj~;.mg statistic indicates that the residuals in all tests were 
white noise. 
Since the short-term rates arethr~e-month rates sampled monthly, the 
variance-covariance matrix from ordinary least squares (OLS) is not consistent. 
Hansen and Hodrick (1980) provide the consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
In this chapter the Cumby, Huizinga and Obstfeld (1983) two-step two-stage 
least squares (2S2SLS) method is employed which provides estimates similar 
to those of Hansen and Hodrick but are more general because they allow for 
heteroskedasticity of the residuals. This method was also used by Cumby and 
Mishkin (1988) .in their study of the link between European and US real interest 
rates. 
The 2S2SLS estimates of <9> are 
(x·zo-1 z·xr 1 x·zn-1 z·y <11> 
where X is the matrix of rewessors, Zis a matrix of instruments, y is the 
dependent variable, and n is given by , 
I. T "' "' 
(1 fr) I. I. Z'tJ.l.tJ.l.t-kZt-k <12> 
f&. ..... ~~I ' 
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where L is the order of the moving average (MA) process and T is the number of 
observations. Cumby and Mishkin show that for three month rates sampled 
monthly the MA process is of the second order. 
Table Ill presents the results from the application of 2S2SLS to equation 
<9>.The instruments used are current and one-lag values of the three-month 
Eurocurrency deposit rates on the Pound Sterling, Deutsche-mark, and French 
franc; current and one-lag Values of three-month US treasury bill rates; the 
regressor variables lagged once'; and a time trend. Eurocurrency deposit rates 
were obtained from OECD Eincincial Statjstjcs: Section 1-Part 2. US treasury bill 
rates were obtained from the Federal ReserVe Bulletin. 
While the Plaza Agreement took place in September 1985, the results 
presented in Table Ill partition the sample between February and March 1986. 
In accordance with Klein, Mizrach and Murphy (1989), the sample is partitioned 
on the basis of a moving sample Chow test..The test involves computing an F-
ratio statistic as: 
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TABLE Ill 
TESTS FOR THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF 
EUROCURRENCY RATES 
Maturity(years) bo b1 b2 R2 F(df) 
Less than 5 -0.035 . 0.028 0.308* ·o.343 5.49** 
Jan84-Feb86 (-1.112) (0.255) (4.116) (2,21) 
Less than 5 0.011 0.539* -0.129 0'.383 1 0.23* 
Mar86-Feb89 . (0:469) (4.507) (-0.678) (2,33) 
Greater than 5 '-0.045* 0.034 0.313* 0.532 11.96* 
Jan84-Feb86 (-3.017) (0.466) (7.841) (2,21) 
Greater than 5 -0.011 o.44r 
f 
0.122 0.534 18.13* 
Mar86-Feb89 (-0.31 ~) (2.848) (0.629) (2,33) 
Greater than 7 -0.050* -0.003 0.302* 0.584 14.72* 
Jan84-Feb86 (-5.235) (-0.060) (7.015) (2,21) 
Greater than 7 -0.005 0.412* 0.001 0.411 11.52* 
Mar86-Feb89 (-0.156) (3.022) (0.006) (2,33) 
The t-stattstic is in parentheses and it is based on the standard errors from the 2S2SLS 
procedure of Cumby, Huizinga and·Obstfeld (1983). 
*Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Significant at the 0 05 level 
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Where JJ.'TJJ.T is the sum of squared residuals over the whole period. J.1'1J.11 is 
the sum of squared resid_uals over the su_b-period January 84-February 86 and 
JJ.'2J.12 is the sum of squares residuals over the sub-period March 86-February 
89. n1 and n2 are the number of observaUons in the first and second sub-
periods, respectively. k is the number o(parameters. 
The partition point is chosen where the F-ratio statis~ic reaches a 
maximum. The values of the F-ratio statistic for different partition dates are 
shown in Table' IV. The F-r~tio is largest.atthe February 86/March 86 point for 
ECU Eurobonds with maturities greater than 5 and greater than 7 years while it 
is largest at the Janl:J~ry 86/February 86 breaking point for ECU Eurobonds with 
a maturity of less than 5 years. For purposes of uniformity, the February 
86/March 86 breaking point is adopted .for all three ECU Eurobonds. All the 
calculated F-values are significant at the 0.01 level. 
The partition represents a lag of five months from the actual agreement. 
The same conclusion was reached by Klein, Mizrach and Murphy (1989 p.11) 
who argue that this " is consistent with the view that a change in the policy 
regime requires some time to become_ credible to market participants." As a test 
of the sensitivity of the results, the actual date of the Agreement 
(September/October 1985) was used as the partition date. The results obtained 
are virtually identical to those in Table Ill. 
Table Ill reveals that, as hypothesized, prior to the Agreement, the 
contemporaneous change in the Eurodollar short-term rate has a significant 
(0.01 level) impact on the long-term ECU interest rate. Followingthe 
Agreement, the contemporaneous change in the US short term Eurocurrency 
rate is insignificant at conventional levels of significance. Thus, 
contemporaneous changes in the short term Eurodollar rate are no longer part 
of the investors' information set. Hence, the term structure relationship fails to 
TABLE IV 
MOVING SAMPLE CHOW TESTS 
Partition Point ECUL5* ECU5-7** 
Sep. 85 2.367 2.989 
Oct.85 2.132 2.590' 
Nov.85 2.132 2.577 
Dec. 85 2.942 2.706 
Jan. 86 3.161 2.973 
Feb. 86 2.742 3.264 
Mar. 86 '2.310 2.526 
• ECULS are ECU bonds with a maturity of less than 5 years. 
•• ECUS-7 are ECU bonds with a maturity between 5 to 7 years. 
••• ECUG7 are ECU bonds with a maturity greater than 7 years. 











hold. Moreover, contemporaneous changes in ~CU short-term rates are now a 
significant determinant (0.01 level) of the long-term ECU rate. In summary, in 
the presence of exchange rate coordination, changes in the US short term rate 
are no longer significant, whereas changes in short-term ECU rates become the 
important determinant of long term ECU rates. 
Summary 
This chapter investigates the interdependence of the term structure 
of Eurocurrency interest rates for the ECU and the US dollar for the period. The 
results affirm that the Plaza Agreement represents a significant change in policy 
regime. After this meeting, pressure on the currencies of the major,members of 
the EMS was substantially reduced, and investors became convinced that 
member countries of the EMS and the US were serious about coordinating their 
exchange rate policies. 
CHAPTERV 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A dynamic, factor analysis model has been ,utilized in the first essay to 
estimate attractiveness indices for EGlJ Eurobonds of two distinct maturities. A 
test for the equality of coefficients across maturities revealed no significant 
difference in the behaviour of the two bonds.· Thus, an additional model was 
estimated utilizing a pooled sample of .both ECU Eurobonds. 
The models utilized the real yield on ECU Eurobonds as the measured 
variable containing information on the attractiveness of ECU Eurobonds. 
Holding constant the effect of actual capital controls, an equation is specified 
relating the real returns on ECU Eurobonds to the attractiveness of these 
Eurobonds. A second equation described the determinants of ECU Eurobond 
attractiveness and permitted hypothesis tests of the relationship between these 
variables and ECU Eurobond attractiveness. 
Aside from a significant autocorrelation effect, ECU Eurobond 
attractiveness is negatively ralated to the real returns on Euro-DM bonds. This 
result confirms empirically the often cited, l;>ut as yet unte$ted, observation in the 
financial press that Euro-DM bonds are traditional alternatives to ECU 
Eurobonds. Moreover, it was demonstrated that, as hypothsized, the ECU/US$ 
exchange rate and developments in the Eurodollar bond market do not impinge 
on the attractiveness of ECU Eurobonds. 
The attracti.veriess index evolves over time in a manner consistent with a 
number of financial and political events which have exerted a significant 
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bearing on the ECU Eurobond market. Such events include the depreciation of 
the British Pound in the last quarter of 1986, the intensification of military conflict 
in the Persian Gulf area in the summer of 1987, and the marked increase in the 
yields on ECU E;urobonds in 1989. 
The second essay inve$tigated the interdependence of the term structure 
of EurocurrencyJnterest rates for the ECU and the US dollar for the period 
January 1984-February 1989. The re:lationship between long-term offshore 
interest rates in the EMS and short-term o,ffshore interest rates in the US was 
examined by combining a simple rationa_l expectations. model of the term 
structure of interest 'rates with the concept of international interest parity. 
Partitioning the data reveals that the linkage between the two interest rates 
does not hold after the Plaza Agreement. The results affirm that the Plaza 
Agreement represents ~ significant change in policy regime because the term 
structure of Eurocurrency interest rates for the the US and the EMS does not 
hold for the posr-Piaza Agreement sub-period. After this meeting, pressure on 
the currencies of the major members of the EMS was substantially reduced, and 
investors became convinced th(lt member countries of the EMS and the US 
were serious about coordinating their exchange rate policies. By examining 
ECU Eurobond rates this chapter·captures the impact of coordinated exchange 
rate policy by the EMS countries on the term str~cture of ECU-US dollar 
Eurocurrency rates. On the other hand, individual exchange rate policies of the 
EMS members, which can,be captured by examining their respective 
Eurocurrency markets, tend to reflect considerations other than those pertinent 
to the EMS. Moreover, by subdividing the period into pre and post Plaza 
periods, the results capture the impact of coordination of exchange rate policies 
on long-term ECU Eurobond rates. 
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APPENDIX 
THE DYMIMIC MODEL 
The economic model of chapter Ill is specified in state-space form 
so that the EM algorithm can be applied. The state-space form allows maximum 
likelihood estimates to be extracted from the Kalman filter recursive algorithm. 
There are two vector equations in a state-space model and it has the 
following general form: 
Xt= 0Xt-1 + ()Z1t + Vt. 
jx1 jxj jx1 jxk kx1 jx1 
Yt= ~Xt + BZ2t +St. 




In most applications the covariance matrices are constant over time so that their 
time subscript can be suppressed (Watson and Engle, 1983). 
Thus, 
(:yNr·~~ J 
where Xt is a jx1 state vector ef unobsenled variables. Yt is a vector of 
measurements (also called indicator variables). They provide ,noisy information 
about the behaviour of the state variable Xt (Becketti and Hakkio, 1987). 
5 1 
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Z1 is a kx1 vector of observable exogenous and lagged dependent 
variables; Z2 is a kx1 vecto~ of observable and lagged dependent variables; vt 
is a jx1 vector of serially u~correlated random errors; et is a px1 vector of of 
disturbances which is· serially uncorrelated and is independent of Vt; and 0, a, w 
and B are coefficient matrices.· Equation <A 1 > is known as the transition 
' 
equation and describes the,evolution of the unobserved variables. Equation 
<A2> is the meaS,!J~ement equation. It describes the relatiqnship between the 
unobserved variables and the measured Y variables (Melvin and 
' ' 
' ' 
Schlagenhauf, 1985) . 
. , 
In many instances, the parameters are known in advance and the only 
issue is the estimation of the state vector. tn this c'ase, however, the parameters 
are estimated. This p~rticular form of the model is referred to as a DYMIMIC 
' ' ,· ' 
(~namic Multiple Indicator Multiple..Qause) model by Engle and Watson 
(1981 ). 
According to Harvey (1982), the log likelihood for equations A 1-A3 is 
L(O)= constant- 1/2 I.(logiHt + f'tHt-1ft). <AS> 
where ft is the innovation i,n Yt· ft is known as an 'innovation' due to the fact that 
' ' 
it includes no past information on Yt but only a new element not present in the 
past (Gr~upe, 1984)~ 
Formally: 
ft= Yt-Ytlt-1· <A6:> 
Ht is the variance of ft and 9 is the vector of unknown parameters. ft and Ht are 
calculated with the Kalman filter. To maximize the log likelihood function, a 
derivative free procedure consisting of an estimation step and a maximization 
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step is employed. The two steps of the EM algorithm are iterated to 
convergence. Using specified starting values for the first iteration, the 
estimation step constructs the estimate of the missing observation conditional 
on the observed dat? and the parameters. 
Let Yt =(Yt. Yt-1, .... Z1t, Z1t-1 , ........ Z2t, Z2t-1 ....... ) <A7> 
Xtjt-i =E(XtiY.t-i) <A8> 
Ytlt-i=E(YtiiYt-i) <A9> 
Pt!t-i=Var(Xt IYt-i) <A10> 
The Kalman filter is a recursive method for calculating E(XtiYt) using the 
following equations: 
Xtjt-1 =0Xt-1lt-1 + aZ1t 
Pt!t-1=0Pt-1lt-10' + Q 
Ytjt-1 =ooXtjt-1 + BZ2t 
Ht=ooPt!t-1oo' +A 
Xt!t=Xtjt-1 + Pt!t-1 oo'Ht-1 (Yt-Ytjt-1) 







Equations A 11 to A 16 generate the means and covariance matrix of the joint 
distribution of (Yt Xt) conditional on Yt. These values can then be substituted 
into (A 15) and (A 16) to find Xt!t and Pt!t· Following Melvin and Schlagenhauf 
(1985) the algorithm will be started using a vague prior. A value of zero will be 
assigned to XOIO and 1000 for POlO· The Kalman filter generates minimum 
mean square error estimates of Xt using the data up through t(XtiT). 
Xt!T=Xtlt+ A(Xt+ 1IT- Xt+ 1lt) <A17> 
At=Pt!t0'Pt+ 1lt <A18> 
Pt!T=Ptit+ At{Pt+ 1lt- Pt+ 1ltlA't <A19> 
54 
The second step of the EM algorithm - the maximization step calculates MLEs of 
the parameters conditional on the observed and newly created data (Watson 
and Engle, 1983). 
The EM algorithm was kindly provided by Dr. Donald Schlagenhauf at 
Arizona State University. 
VITA 
Bassem Abou Zeid 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: ESSAYS ON ECU-DE~OMINATED FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
Major Field: Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Beirut, Lebanon, August 3, 1961, the son of 
Mohammed S. and Nadia Abou Zeid~ , 
Education: Graduated from International College, Beirut, Lebanon, in 
June 1980; received Bachelor of Arts Degree in Economics from 
the American University of Beirut in June, 1983; received Master 
of Science Degree in Economics from Oklahoma State University 
in May, 1986;,completed requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy Degree at Oklahoma State University in December, 
1990. 
Memberships: American Economic Association; Southern Economic 
Associa~ion. · 
